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ABSTRACT
This paper recognizes two main factors that causethe capital requirement to affect the weighted
average cost ofcapital and hence the investment behavior ofbanks: underpriced debt resulting
from thedeposit insurance and information asymmetrybetween managers and the stock market.
For a bank enjoying a low cost ofdebt (deposits), an increased proportion of equity financing
raises the weighted average cost ofcapital. When the stock market underestimates thevalue of
abank due to information asymmetry, equity financing is expensive. This paper finds that banks
constrained by the tightened capital requirement grew slower in 1991 and that information
asymmetryas well asunderpriced deposits played a role in explaining the slower growth.
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The increased number of bank failures in the 1980s raised concerns about the
riskiness of banks and hence prompted movements for tighter capital requirements. The
BasleAgreement of 1988 requiresthat banks meet the minimum capital ratios of 4 percent
tier 1 capital and 8 percent tier 1 plus tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets by the end of
1992.’
The capitalrequirement, whichimposes constraints on the capital structure ofbanks,
can affect theweighted average cost of capital(the average costofequity and debt weighted
by their proportions) and hence the investment decision of banks. The well-known
proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and following works [Hamada (1969),
Rubinstein (1973), andHsia (1981)1 showthattheweighted average costofcapital (WACC)
is independent of capital structure when the costs of equity and debt are determined in a
frictionless market. In thebanking sector, the cost of debt (deposits) is not determined by
the market since deposits are insured. In addition, the cost of equity can deviate from
market fundamentals when there isinformation asymmetrybetween managersand the stock
market.
Assuming thatdeposit financing is cheaper than equityfinancing due to underpriced
‘Tier 1 capital consists mainly of common stock and some perpetual preferred stock.
Tier 2 capital includes preferred stock, subordinated debt, and allowance for loan losses.
In calculating risk-weighted assets, assets are classified into 4 risk-weight categories: zero
percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent risk-weight category. For example, most
government securities fall into zero risk-weight category, claims guaranteed by depository
institutions are given 20 percent risk-weight, loans fully secured by first liens on
residential properties are included in 50 percent risk-weight category, and most other
loans fall into 100 percent risk-weight category. Risk weights are also applied to the
credit-equivalent amount of off-balance-sheet items.
1deposit insurance premiums, using ahigher proportion ofequity increases the WACC. An
increased weighted average cost of capital will narrow the scope of profitable investment
opportunities. In this case, the capital requirement limits the banks’ ability to take
advantage of the option value (banks’ risk that is not reflected in the interest rate on
deposits) deriving from the deposit insurance. This effect may be the one intended by
regulators.
There is a second effect of the capital requirement that may unduly limit the growth
potential ofbanks. Finance literature ofthe recentyears suggests that the cost ofequity can
be excessively high on occasion. The stock of a firm can be mispriced due to asymmetric
information between the management ofthe firm and the stock market [Myers and Majiuf
(1984), Miller and Rock (1985), MacKie-Mason (1990), and Korajczyk et al.(1990)].
Managers arebetter informed about the future cash flow of the firm. Issuing shares at an
unfavorable price (below the present value of thefuture cash flow estimated by managers)
dilutes the value of existing shares. Assuming managers have favorable inside information
and act in the interest of existing shareholders, they may pass up a good investment
opportunity rather than issue shares to finance the investment [Myers and Majiuf (1984)].
Giventhislogic, the statutorycapital requirement, whichnecessitates some equityfinancing,
can restrainbanks from pursuing profitable investment opportunities. In this case, we may
say that banks are handicapped by the capital requirement which limits the choice among
financing alternatives. This effectof the capitalrequirementis not only undesirablebut also
disruptive. The investment decision of a bank may change with the degree of information
asymmetry faced by thebank. Thus, in assessing the effects of the capital requirement, it
2is important to understand the role of asymmetric information.
The findings of previous studies generally support the presence of asymmetric
information. They examine theinvestment behavior ofcommercial firms and find apositive
relationshipbetween thefirms’ cash flowandinvestment [Fazzari et al.(1988) andDevereux
and Schiantarelli (1990)]. The positive relationship, they argue, indicates the difficulty of
external financing that may arisefrom asymmetric information. Since bank assets, loans in
particular, areinformation intensive, information asymmetryis likely to be more serious in
the banking sector than in many other industries producing standardized products. In
addition, the effect of information asymmetry will be more pronounced when equity
financing is necessary. Thus, the application of this literature to the banking sector may
produce more interesting results.
There are many recent studies that look at the relationship between the capital
adequacy and growth ofbanks [e.g., Johnson (1991) and Bernanke and Lown (1992)]. These
studies generally find that better capitalized banks grew faster in recent periods. They
attribute the finding, atleastpartly, to the tightened capital requirement, but arenot explicit
aboutthemechanism through which the capitalrequirement affectsthe investment decision
of banks.
This paper explicitly recognizes underpriced debt and asymmetric informationastwo
main reasons why the bank capital requirement matters and tests their empirical
significance. The growth of risk-weighted assets of bank holding companies during 1991 is
regressed on proxy variables representing information asymmetry and the cost ofdebt. The
empirical test generally supports thatunderpriced debt and asymmetricinformation affected
3the investment decision of bank holding companies: Risk weighted assets grew slower at
banks experiencing more information asymmetry and at bankswhose debt was moreheavily
underpriced. The empirical section also compares publicly held and privately held bank
holding companies and finds that asymmetric information more significantly affected the
investment decision of bank holding companies whose stocks are publicly traded. This
finding may be explained by the difficulty of transmitting information to the stock market.
The rest of thispaper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model showing
the roles ofunderpriced debt and asymmetricinformation in causingthe capitalrequirement
to affect the investment behavior of banks. The third section discusses empirical
methodology and results. Section 4 summarizes the article’s findings.
2. Equity Financing and Weighted Average Cost of Capital
This section presents a two-period model that shows how equity financing used to
meet the capital requirement affects the WACC of banks. Assuming that deposits are
underpriced, increased equity financing raises the WACC and hence narrows the scope of
profitable investment. However, as long as the stock market correctly assesses the return
fromthe existing and additional investments of abank, theWACC does notexceed the level
that would be determined by free market forces, i.e., the case of zero option value. Thus,
in the absence of information asymmetry, the increased WACC resulting from a higher
capital requirement may be desirable in terms of both resource allocation and regulatory
efficiency. On the other hand, when there is asymmetric information, the capital
requirement can unduly limits the growth potential of banks by excessively raising the
WACC.





A - assets subject to the capital requirement.
B - assets free of the capital requirement.
D - Deposits.
C - capital.
The bank has noutstanding shares at thebeginning of period 1. In period 2, the outcome
ofthe bank’sinvestment becomes publiclyknown, and theshare price is determined by the
value of capital. For simplicity, corporate and personal income taxes are assumed away.
The management of the bank maximizes the present value of its share price by making
investment decisions in period 1.2 In order to focus on the effect ofthe capital requirement
on the bank’s investment decision, it is assumed that the bank starts period 1 with the
required capitalratioand maintainsthe samecapital ratio. Thus, whenthe bank undertakes
an additional investment, it raises capital equal to the required ratio times the investment.
If the bank does not undertake any additional investment in period 1, the present
value of share price is:
2This is equivalent to maximizing the expected wealth of existing shareholders in this
model.
5= (1 +rAI)A + (1 +rB)B — (1 +rD)D (El)
n(1 +rE)
PV = the present value of share price (based on the bank manager’s information).
rA, = the rate of return on existing A expected by the management.
r8
= the expected rate of return on B (assumed to be constant and publicly known).
= the interest rate on deposits.
rE = the rate of return on the bank’s equity required by the stock market.
The numerator is the expected return from existing assets estimated by the bank
management minuspayment to depositors, and thedenominator is the discount factor times
the number of existing shares.
When the bank decides to increase A, it raises the required capital and uses either
additional deposits or funds previously invested in B. The choice may depend on the
availability of additional deposits. I examine both cases.
Case 1: It is assumed that the bank can increase deposits without biddingup interest rates.
The bank finances a new investment that is subject to the capital requirement with newly
raised capital from issuing an additional share and deposits. Bi sassumed to be zero for
simplicity.
The price of the additional share,
= (l+sAI)A + (1+sA2)i~.A — (1+rD)D — (l+rD)o.D (E2)
(n + 1)(1 +rE)
5A1 - rate of return on existing A expected by the stock market.
6SA2 - rate ofreturn on the additional investment expected by the stock market.
The price is the value of capital in period 2 expected by the stock market divided by the
discount factor times total number of shares.
(E3)
k
where k is the required ratio of C to A.
When capital increases by p, the bank can increase A by P/k and still meet the capital
requirement.
(E4)
The increase in D is the increase in A minus the newly raised capital.
Substituting E3 and E4 into E2 and solving for p,3
= k{(l+sAl)A — (1+rD)D} (E5)
(fl+l)k(l+rE) - (1+sA2) + (l-k)(1 + rD)
Substituting ES into E3,
= (1 +sAJ)A — (1 +rD)D (E6)
(n+l)k(l+rE) — (1+sA,) + (l—k)(l+rD)
Substituting ES into E4,
3Given the limited liability, i.e., non-negative returns from the existing investments of
the bank, the denominator of this expression must be positive.
7= (1—k){(1+sAl)A — (1+rD)D} (E7)
(fl+l)k(l+rE) — (1+sA2) + (l—k)(l+rD)
The expected change in the present value of share price as a result of issuing an
additional share and making investment is:
= (l+rAl)A + (1+rA2)~A— (1+rD)D — (l+rD)~D (n + 1)(1 +rE)
— (1 +rAl)A — (1 +rD)D (E8)
n(l +rE)
= (l+rA2)b.A — (l+rD)8.D — (l+rAl)A — (l+rD)D
(fl+l)(l+rE) n(n+1)(l +rE)
rAl - the rate of return on existing A expected by managers.
rA2 - the rate of return on the additional investment expected by managers.
This expression is the difference between the present value with and without the issuance
of an additional share. Managers can increase the present value of share price by issuing
an additional share if APV is positive.
Substituting E6 and E7 into E8,
1J’V = [(fl+1){rA2
— krE — (1—k)rD}{(1+rAJ)A — (1+rD)D}
— (TA, sA2) {(l +rAl)A — (1 +rD)D} (E9)
- n(rAl-sAJ){(1+rA,) - (1-k)(1+rD)}] /
[n(n +l)(l +rE) {(n +1)k(l +rE) — (1 +SA,) + (1 —k)(l +rD)}]
8If there is no asymmetric information, i.e., rAl = 5A1 and rA2 = 5A2~E9 becomes
iJ?V [{rA2
— krE — (1 —k)rD} {(l +rAJ)A — (1 +rD)D}1 / (ElO)
[n(n+1)(1+rE){(n+1)k(1+rE) — (1+r42) + (l—k)(l+rD)}]
Then
oPV .. 0 if rA2 > krE + (1 - k)rD (Cl)
In words, the present value of the expected share price increases as long as the expected
return from the additional investment is greater than theweighted average cost of capital.
The minimum weight, k, is set by regulators.
When the Modigliani-Miller theorems are combined with the option pricing model
[Hsia (1981)],
rE = p + (p - rM)(1 - k)/k
where p is the cost ofequity for an all-equity firmofa given risk class, and rM is the cost of
debt determined based on the riskiness of the firm. Substituting this expression into Cl,
WACC = p - (1 - k)(rM - rD) (Ell)
If rD is market determined (rD = rM), the WACC is independent of capital structure (k).
However, assuming the deposit insurance premium is underpriced (rM > rD), the WACC
increases with k. In other words, a higher proportion of equity financing results in a
decreased option value deriving from the deposit insurance. However, WACC will never
exceed p in this case. Thus, although a higher capital requirement may make banks more
selective about investment projects, it cannot make them overly selective.
9If rAl > 5A1 and rA2 = 5A2~then E9 becomes
i~PV = [(n+l){rA, — krE — (l—k)rD}{(l+rAJ)A — (1+rD)D}
— n(rAJ—sAl){(l+rA2) — (l—k)(1+rD)}] / (El2)
[n(n +l)(l +rE){(n +l)k(l +rE) — (1. +TA,) + (1 —k)(l +TD)}]
Hence,
APV 0 if
r kr +(l—k)r + n(rAl—sAJ){(l+rA,) — (l—k)(1+rD)} (C2) A2 ED (n + 1) {(l. +rAl)A — (1 +rD)D}
When the stockmarket is pessimisticabout the return fromthe bank’s existing investments,
equity financing becomes expensive. Thus, the overall funding cost increases. In this case,
unless thebank finds an investment opportunity that is profitable enough to compensate for
the fundingcost disadvantage arising from the capital requirement, undertaking investment
will dilute the value of existing shares. Then the bank may pass up reasonably profitable
investment opportunities that may be undertaken by other institutions.
If rAl = SAl and rA2 > 5A2~E9 becomes
= [(n+1){rA2
— krE — (l—k)rD}{(l+rAJ)A — (l+rD)D}
— (rA,—sA,){(l+rAJ)A — (l+rD)D}] / (El3)
[n(n +l)(l+rE){(n +l)k(l +rE) — (l+sA,) + (l—k)(l +rD)}]
Then
APVO if
10TA, krE+(l—k)rD + r~sA2 (C3)
The result is similar when the stock market underestimates the return from the additional
investment. The capital requirement narrows the scope of profitable investment
opportunities for the bank.
Case 2: The bank finances a newinvestment that is subject to the capital requirement with
newly raised capital from issuing an additional share and assets that are not subject to
capital requirements.
The price of the additional share,
(l+sAI)A + (1+sA,)&4 + (l+rB)B + (1+rB)~B — (l+rD)D (E2a)




Bi sreduced by the increase in A minus the newly raised capital, P.
Solving in the same way,
i~~.PV = [(n+l){rA2
— krE — (1—k)rB}{(1÷rAJ)A+ (l+rB)B — (1+rD)D}
— (rA,—sA2){(1+rAl)A + (l+rB)B — (l+rD)D}
(E9a)
— n(rAJ—sAJ){(1+rA,) — (l—k)(1+rB)}] /
[n(n+1)(l+rE){(n+l)k(l+rE) — (l+sA,) + (1—k)(1+rB)}J
11Ifthere is no asymmetric information, i.e., rAl = 5A1 and rA2 = 5A2’ then
APV . 0 if r~ .. krE + (1 -k)r~. (Cia)
If r8
= rD, say both are the risk-free rate of return, the existence ofB does not affect the
investment decision of the bank. However, if rB > r~3due to incorrect risk weighting (e.g.,
ignoring the interest risk of government securities), the opportunity cost of investment in
high-risk-weight assets is higher. Then the bank may limit investment in A to highly
profitable opportunities. The incorrect risk weighting will present the bank with an
advantage in pursuing growth since it is profitable to invest depositsin B. The direction of
growth, however, will be biased toward B.
If rAl > sAl and rA2 = 5A2~then
~PV .0 if
r kr +(i—k)r + n(rAl—sAJ){(i+rA,) — (lk)(l+rB)} (C2a) A2 BB (n + 1) {(1 +rAl)A + (1 +rB) — (1 +rD)D}
If rAl = 5A1 and rA2 > 5A2’ then
~PV 0 if
krE+(l—k)rB + rA2sA2 (C3a)
n+1
The effects ofinformation asymmetry are similar to those in case 1. Equity financing raises
the weighted average cost of capitalwhen the stock market is pessimistic about the future
earnings prospects of the bank.
This analysis shows that theWACC ofabank increaseswith theproportion ofequity
needed to finance a new project. In the absence of information asymmetry, although the
12capital requirement affects the investment decision of banks, it does not handicap banks
relative to other institutions. Hence, information asymmetry is the major factor that causes
the capital requirementto restrainbanks from pursuingprofitable investment opportunities.
3. Empirical Estimation
The previous section has recognized main factors that cause the capital requirement
to affect theinvestment decision ofbanks: decreased proportions ofcheap deposit financing,
excessively high costs of equity financing due to information asymmetry, and incorrect risk
weighting. Due to these factors, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) rises with
equity financing. This sectionexamines cross-sectional differences in the growth ofrisk-
weighted assets to evaluate the roles of underpriced deposit financing and information
asymmetry. Particular attention will be paid to asymmetric information that can unduly
restrain banks form pursuing profitable investment opportunities. Incorrect risk-weighting
should not cause any cross-sectional differences.
When the capitalrequirement is tightened, banks need to use more equity to finance
investment. The need for additional equity to finance a marginal investment may be related
to the gap between the actual and required capital ratio. While banks with more capital
than required can undertake an additional investment without increasing theproportion of
equity financing, banks constrained by the higher capital requirement need to increase the
proportion of equity financing for an additional investment. Thus, a higher capital
requirement causes larger increases in the WACC for banks with lower capital ratios. This
relationship should hold among banks that are not constrained by the capital requirement,
as well as constrained banks. Many banks may want to maintain some excess capital to
13avoid difficulties in the future. Thus, there should be a positive relationship between the
capital ratio of a bank and growth of its risk-weighted assets. In addition, the relationship
is expected to be more pronounced for banks whose stocks are underpriced due to
information asymmetrybecause the cost of equity is higher for those banks.
3.a. Data
The sample of this study consists of the highest bank holding companies (bank
holding companies not owned by otherbank holding companies)with $150 million or more
in consolidated assets. The main data sourceis the Y-9C Reports compiled by the Federal
Reserve Board. The reports can be regarded as the bank holding company’s counterpart
of the Bank Call Reports (Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income). The Y-9C
Reports offer fairly detailed financial information, including financing activities and
information necessary to calculate the risk-weighted assets.4 However, the reports do not
include stock prices. The Y-9C Reports data are mergedwith the stockprice data compiled
by SNL Securities. The stock price data include all publicly traded stocks ofbank holding
companies. In addition, the analysis incorporates the data on the employment condition at
the state level compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Some observations that are believed to contaminate the analysis have been
eliminated from the sample. Since the stock prices of merger targets tend to behave
abnormally, merger targets announced in 1991 havebeen excluded. I have also eliminated
bank holding companies that grew by more than 100 percent in 1991. It may not be a
4The information necessary to calculate the risk-weighted assets has become available
since the third quarter of 1990. The calculation of risk-weighted assets is based on the
Capital Adequacy Guidelinesprepared by the Federal Reserve Board.
14meaningful attempt to explain thebehaviorofabank holding companymergedwith alarger
one using the before-merger financial structure. In addition, observations have been
dropped when the calculated financial ratios raise a strong suspicion of accounting errors
(e.g., the ratio ofcash dividends declared on common stock to the value of common stock
greater than 1).
3.b. Specification
This section attempts to explain the cross-sectional variation in the growth of risk-
weighted assets between the end of 1990 and the end of 1991. The adjustment of risk-
weighted assets may have started earlier, but for years prior to 1990, risk-weighted assets
cannot be calculated from the Y-9C Reports. The focus is on the effect of the Basle
Agreements of 1988 on the investment behavior of banks and on the significance of
information asymmetry andunderpriced deposits in causingthe capital requirement to limit
the growth.
The main equation to be estimated is the following:5
RRWA = a1 + a2CAPITAL + a3CAPITAL2 + a4STOCK + a5DIVIDEND
(+) (-) (+) (-)
+ a6TREASURY + a7SIZE + a8EOA + a9VOLATILE + a10CORE
(-) (+) (+) (?) (-)
+ a11ECONOMY + a12GROWTH
(+) (?)
RRWA - The change in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets [(risk-weighted
assets / total assets at the end of1991) - (risk-weighted assets/ total assets at the
5The signs in the parenthesis are expected signs.
15end of 1990)].
Changes in total risk-weighted assets can be driven by mergers and acquisitions. RRWA,
which reflects portfolio reshuffling between assets of different risk weights, can resolve the
problem arising from mergers and acquisitions.6 A larger RRWA for a bank holding
companymeans thatthebank holdingcompanyincreased risk-weighted assets afteradjusting
for thegrowth oftotal assets. In additionto adjusting for mergers and acquisitions, RRWA
is more appropriate in analyzingbanks’ responses to the tightened capital requirement than
the growth of total risk-weighted assets, assuming that banks do not exercise much control
over the size of their liabilities in the short run.
CAPITAL - the ratio oftier 1 plus tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets at the end of 1990.
Tier 1 plus tier 2 capital is chosen over tier 1 capital since morebanks appearto have had
problems with meeting the tier 1 plus tier 2 capital requirement (Table 1). Well-capitalized
banks can undertake a new investment under a tightened capital requirement without
significantly changing their desired mix of equity and debt. Thus, the investment decision
of banks with more capital should be less restrained by the minimum capital requirement.
The square of the capital ratio is included since the relationship between the capital ratio
and asset growth is likely to be nonlinear. In otherwords, the difference in thecapital ratio
may not matter much among banks with comfortable capital ratios.
6Given that the sample consists of highest bank holding companies, it is not practical
to eliminate the bank holding companies involved in mergers and acquisitions. A highest
bank holding companies may own other bank holding companies that may also own
other bank holding companies as well as banks. Apart from the difficulty of tracing
merger and acquisition activities, the loss of sample is too large ifwe eliminate highest
bank holding companies on the basis of mergers and acquisitions at lower levels.
16STOCK - the rate ofchange in the stock price ofbank holding companies [(Price at the end
of the current year - Price at the end of the previous year) / Price at the end of
the previous year].
A significant rise in stock price may be due to the stock market’s learning of favorable
information possessed by management. Similarly, revelationofunfavorable information will
result in a sharp drop in stock price. Thus, if the transmission of information is a main
cause for stock price movements, there should be a positive relationship between changes
in stock price and investment activities. Both theprice change during 1990 (STOCK9O) and
that during 1991 (STOCK91) are included.
DIVIDEND - The ratio of cash dividends declared on common stock in 1990 to the value
of common stock at the end of 1990.
Miller and Rock (1985) argues that a major purpose for a firm to pay out dividends is to
signal favorable future earnings prospects to the stock market. Given this signalling effect,
managerswith more favorable information unknown to themarket havean incentive to pay
moredividends. Assumingtheinformationproblem isnot completely solved, though abated,
by the dividend signal, more dividends may mean more information asymmetry and slower
growth in the following period. In the case of commercial firms that are constrained by
liquidity,this variablewill hardly capture information asymmetry. A large dividend reduces
liquid assets and hence results in slower growth. For financial intermediaries, however, the
availability of liquid assets is less likely to be a major factor affecting investment. In
addition, the availability of funds should not affect the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total
assets, though it may affect the growth of total risk-weighted assets. Thus, this variable,
17when controlled for capital adequacy, can capture information asymmetry.
TREASURY - the net purchase of treasury stock in 1990 divided by common stock.
When stock is underpriced due to asymmetric information, managers can increase the per
share value of stock by purchasing back some shares at a low price. Then the purchase of
treasury stock can be a sign ofinformation asymmetry.
SIZE - natural log of total assets at the end of 1990.
Since larger banks are better known to the stock market, they may suffer less information
asymmetry.
EOA - before-tax earnings on assets in 1990.
Current earnings may signal future earnings prospects and reduce information asymmetry.
VOLA11LE - the standard deviation of annual EOA of the years between 1986 and 1991.
High volatilityofEOAmay make it difficultfor thestock market to estimate future earnings
prospects and henceincrease thepossibility ofinformation asymmetry. Onthe other hand,
managers of a bank with highly volatile earnings may be aggressive risk-takers. These two
effects, working into opposite directions, make the expected sign ambiguous.
CORE - theproportionofcore deposits (transactions accounts and savings accounts) to total
assets at the end of 1990.
Assuming core deposits are less sensitive to interest rates, a smaller portion of the subsidy
provided by the deposit insurance is passed on to core depositors than that passed on to
more interest-sensitive time depositors. Thus, deposits are likely to be more heavily
underpriced for banks with more core deposits, i.e., the average cost of deposits (rD) may
be lower. Thus, the tightened capital requirement, which restricts the use of underpriced
18deposits, should have larger impact on the investment decision of banks with more core
deposits.7 Differentiating Eli with respect to k (the required capital ratio),
3WACC =r —r
3k M D
When the gap between the interest rate incorporating risk premiums (rM) and the actual
interest rate on deposits is larger, the required rate of return on the marginal investment
increases faster as the proportion of equity financing increases.
ECONOMY - the rate of growth in non-farm payroll employment during 1991 in the state
where the headquarter of the bank holding company is located.
This variable intends to capture the abundance of profitable investment opportunities
(projects with high rA2). There should be more profitable investment opportunities in a
growing economy. Holding the funding cost constant, bank holding companies with more
investment opportunities will grow faster.
GROWTH -the rate ofgrowth oftotal assets between the end of 1990 and the end of 1991.
It may be difficult to maintain the same portfolio composition for a bank that rapidly
7Assuming away asymmetric information, underpriced debt is the major reason why
the capital requirement matters. If the deposits of a bank were not underpriced in the
first place, changed mix of equity and debt should not change the WACC of the bank.
Then a changed capital requirement would not affect the investment behavior of the
bank. On the other hand, an increased proportion of equity financing in response to the
tightened capital requirement significantly raises the WACC of banks with heavily
underpriced debt. The level of WACC should remain lower for banks with more heavily
underpriced deposits under the tightened capital requirement, but the tightening of the
capital requirement will induce a larger change in the WACC of those banks. Assuming
thatbanks equated their WACC and the return from marginal investment before the
change in the capital requirement, a larger change in the WACC induces a larger change
in the investment behavior ofbanks.
19expands or contracts. This variable intends to capture a possible ad hoc relationship
between the asset growth and the change in portfolio composition.
As shown above, this analysis uses the lagged values ofmost independent variables
in order to avoid the simultaneity problem. An exception is STOCK91, which seems to be
an important variable apriori. The variable can cause a simultaneity problem. The results
of regressions, however, are found not to be affected by the exclusion of STOCK91.
Heteroskedasticity seems to be a more serious problem. The investment decisions mayvary
more widely among large banks that engage in more diverse activities. In addition, since
banks with comfortablecapitalratios can freely choose the rateofgrowth, their growth rates
may show a larger variance. Fast growth may also result in a large shift of portfolio
composition. A common treatment for heteroskedasticity is a weighted regression. Given
that heteroskedasticity can arise with respectto manyvariables in this case, it is difficult to
accurately specify the structure of heteroskedasticity and obtain an appropriate weight. I
use the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix suggested by White in deriving t
values. Table 2 compares the consistent estimates and OLS estimates of the standard
deviations. The difference between the two estimates appears to be significant, indicating
thepresence ofheteroskedasticity. Given fairlylarge samplesize ofthis analysis (more than
200 observations), t values based on the consistent estimates should be unbiased.
3.c. Results
Table 3 shows the estimation results. The estimated coefficients mostly have
expected signs. The capital ratio is found to be significant. As expected, the effect of
CAPITAL is more significant among bank holding companies with relatively low capital
20ratios.8 The positive relationship between the capital ratio andinvestment in risk-weighted
assets can be explained by both underpriced debt and information asymmetry. Hence, it
alone does not constitute evidence of information asymmetry. However, the signs of
variables relevant to information asymmetry (STOCK, DIVIDEND, TREASURY, SIZE,
andEOA) support thepresence ofinformation asymmetry, though lowstatistical significance
prevents a clear conclusion. The statistical significance of DIVIDEND and TREASURY
turns out to be fairly high. The significance of TREASURY deserves attention since the
variable is believed to be particularly relevant to asymmetric information. Given that the
sale and purchase of treasury stock are of temporary nature, TREASURY should well
reflect the response of management to the stock market condition in a given period. The
negative sign of CORE is consistent with the hypotheses that deposits are underpriced in
general and that the WACC of banks with more heavily underpriced deposits is affected
more by the capital requirement. ECONOMY turns out to be insignificant. The high
activity ofinterstate acquisitions in the 1980s may havemade the economic condition at the
state level irrelevant to the growth of bank holding companies.
Table 4 reports the results of regressions using the rate of growth in risk-weighted
assets as the dependentvariable. The qualitative results aresimilar to those oftheprevious
regression. A notable exception is the insignificance of DIVIDEND. A possibility is that
the liquidity effect discussed above plays a role in determining the growth of total assets
even for financialintermediaries. TREASURY, however, continues to be fairly significant.
8Table 7 shows the values of the first derivative with respect to CAPITAL at
different capital ratios.
21The interpretation of this regression requires more caution since the growth in total risk-
weighted assets can be driven largely by mergers and acquisitions.
Table 5 compares the results of estimation using different samples: BHC’s with
publiclytraded stocks (sample 1) and other BHC’s (sample 2). The comparison is possible
since the exclusion of stock price data does not significantly affect the results of the
estimation using sample 1. Estimation using sample2 shows substantially smaller magnitude
of the coefficients of CAPITAL, DIVIDEND, and TREASURY.9 The statistical
significance of those variables is also lower. These findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that information asymmetry between managers and the stock market affects the
banks’ investment decision by raising the costof equity. BHC’s in sample 2 may be owned
mainly by managers and a few large investors, who should be well informed about the
earnings prospects of the BHC’s. Thus, the effect of information asymmetry should be
smaller for privately held BHC’s. In contrast to low significance of variables reflecting
information asymmetry, the effect of CORE is more pronounced in the regression using
sample 2. This result suggests that reduced use of underpriced debt, as opposed to
asymmetric information, is the main channel through which the tightened capital
requirement affect the investment decisionof BHC’s in sample 2. Appendix 1 reports the
results of the Wald test that examines the equalitybetween the coefficient of the variables
reflecting information asymmetry in the two regressions. The test does not convincingly
reject the equality of the coefficient. However, the test variables have expected signs, and
9The smaller effect of CAPITAL may be partly because BHC’s in sample 2 are
better capitalized (see Table 9), but it does not seem to be enough to explain the large
difference in the magnitude of coefficients.
22the equality of the coefficient of TREASURY is rejected with a fairly high confidence
interval (about 91 percent).
Low statistical significance of manyvariables raises the possibility that the inclusion
ofpossibly irrelevantvariablesmay havecaused some problems such as multicollinearityand
inefficiency. Table 6 shows the results of estimation without variables of relatively low
statistical significance. The exclusion does notsubstantially affect either the coefficients or
the statistical significance of included variables.
The main empirical results are that BHC’s with lower capital ratios made smaller
investment in risk-weighted assets and that both information asymmetry and underpriced
debt played their roles in determining the investment behavior of BHC’s in 1991. Given
these results, the tightened capitalrequirement appears to have slowed down the growth of
BHC’s. The mechanisms thorough which the capital requirement affects the investment
decisionare an increased WACC due to a reduced proportionofcheaper deposit financing
and a high costofequity due to asymmetric information. Incorrect risk weighting may also
reduce the overall growth of risk-weight assets, but it should not cause cross-sectional
variations in the growth rates.
4. Conclusion
The tightened capital requirement appears to have affected the investment decision
ofbanks. The growth of risk-weighted assets slowed down in general, and the slowdown is
more pronounced for poorly capitalized banks. In order to understand the implications of
this adjustment, we need to know why the capital requirement affects the investment
decision ofbanks.
23This paperhas recognized two main reasons that the capital requirement alters the
investment decision ofbanks: (1) It reduces the banks’ ability to take advantage ofdeposit
financing which is cheaper because of the deposit insurance and (2) The cost ofequity can
be excessive due to information asymmetry between managers and the stock market.
Section 2 also showed that incorrect risk-weighting could slow down the growth of risk-
weighted assets. Incorrect risk weighting, however, should not cause cross-sectional
variations among banks, and it is not a problem fundamental to the capital requirement
itselfbut aproblem with its implementation. While the reduced option value may improve
both regulatory and economic efficiency, asymmetric information can be a problem in that
it unduly prevents banks from pursuing otherwise profitable investment opportunities.
Empirical resultssupport thatboth underpriced deposits and information asymmetry
contributed to the slow growth of risk-weighted assets after the tightening of the capital
requirement. The growth of risk-weighted assets was slower for banks with more heavily
underpriced debt. The coefficients of variables reflecting information asymmetry indicate
thatbank holdingcompanies invested less inhigh-risk-weightassets when inside information
was morefavorable than the expectation ofthe stock market. For bank holding companies
whose stocks were not publicly traded, capital adequacy and other variables reflecting
information asymmetry turned out to be less significant. This result also underscores the
importance of information asymmetry between managers and the stock market.
Inferring from the estimated effects of variables reflecting asymmetric information,
it is not likely thatthe negative aspect of the capital requirement arising from information
asymmetry outweighs its positive effect of limiting the risk taking of banks. Yet it may be
24desirable to make efforts to mitigate the negative effect of asymmetric information by
implementing the capital requirement in a flexible manner. For example, regulators may
allow moretime to meet the capital requirementfor banks thathaveinsufficient capital but
have sound asset portfolios.
25Table 1: The Distribution of the Capital Ratio
Tier 1 Tier 1 plus tier 2
Mean 0.1160 0.1308
Standard Deviation 0.0680 0.0665
1 percentile 0.0268 0.0419
5 percentile 0.0508 0.0728
10 percentile 0.0631 0.0831
25 percentile 0.0816 0.0992
50 percentile 0.1049 0.1196
75 percentile 0.1353 0.1477
90 percentile 0.1703 0.1821
95 percentile 0.2010 0.2118
99 percentile 0.3930 0.4056


























































60.3Table 3: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: The change in the ratio of risk-weighted
assets to total assets




























Observations 233 233Table 4: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: The rate of growth in risk-weighted assets


























Observations 233 233Table 5: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: The change in the ratio of risk-weighted
assets to total assets

























aModel 5 - Bank holding companies with publicly traded stocks.
Model 6 - Other bank holding companies.Table 6: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: The change in the ratio of risk-weighted
assets to total assets

















aModel 7 - Bank holding companies with publicly traded stocks.




0.05 0.735 0.754 1.258 1.584 0.203 0.774 0.265 0.823
0.06 0.665 0.683 1.104 1.397 0.198 0.702 0.258 0.748
0.07 0.596 0.611 0.950 1.211 0.193 0.630 0.251 0.673
0.08 0.526 0.540 0.796 1.025 0.188 0.559 0.244 0.598
0.09 0.456 0.468 0.642 0.839 0.183 0.487 0.237 0.523
0.10 0.387 0.397 0.488 0.653 0.178 0.415 0.230 0.448
0.11 0.317 0.325 0.334 0.467 0.173 0.344 0.222 0.373
0.12 0.248 0.254 0.180 0.281 0.168 0.272 0.215 0.298
0.13 0.178 0.183 0.026 0.095 0.163 0.200 0.208 0.223
0.14 0.109 0.111 —0.128 —0.091 0.158 0.128 0.201 0.148
0.15 0.039 0.040 —0.282 —0.277 0.153 0.057 0.194 0.073Table 8: Descriptive Statistics
Total Assets
(in millions of dollars)
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3~
Mean 8,535 388 3,767
Median 1,827 289 426
Standard Deviation 20,653 322 13,882
Observations 258 364 622
CAPITAL
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Mean 0.1189 0.1344 0.1280
Median 0.1126 0.1252 0.1194
Standard Deviation 0.0324 0.0571 0.0490
DIVIDEND
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Mean 0.1086 0.0789 0.0913
Median 0.0868 0.0530 0.0707
Standard Deviation 0.0909 0.1217 0.1108
TREASURY
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Mean 0.0139 0.0143 0.0141
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard Deviation 0.0386 0.0614 0.0530
aSample 1 - Bank holding companies with publicly traded stocks.
Sample 2 - Other bank holding companies.
Sample 3 - Combined sample.Appendix 1: Test of Equality
The following regression results are used to test the equality of
the coefficients of the regressions in Table 6.
Dependent Variable: The change in the ratio of risk-weighted
assets to total assets
INTERCEPT —0.0363 CORE -0.0575
(—0.86) (—2.48)
CAPITAL 0.2839 ECONOMY -0.0074
(2.27) (—0.06)
CAPITAL2 -0.3470 GROWTH -0.0797
(—1.64) (—3.38)
DIVIDEND —0.0406 DUMMY]. 0.0302
(—1.60) (0.23)
TREASURY —0.0250 DUMMY2 —0.4956
(—0.93) (—0.67)
SIZE 0.0014 DUNNY3 —0.0099
(0.59) (—0.24)






DUMMY1 is CAPITAL for Sample 1 and 0 for Sample 2.
DUNMY2 is CAPITAL2 for Sample 1 and 0 for Sample 2.
DUNMY3 is DIVIDEND for Sample 1 and 0 for Sample 2.
DUMMY4 is TREASURY for Sample 1 and 0 for Sample 2.
Hypothesis: DUNMY1 = DUMMY2 = 0.
Chi—square value = 2.1342, Probability > 2.1342: 0.3440.
Hypothesis: DUMMY3 = 0.
Chi—square value = 0.0585, Probability > 0.0585: 0.8089.
Hypothesis: DUNNY4 = 0.
Chi—square value = 2.9208, Probability > 2.9208: 0.0874.
Hypothesis: DUMMY]. = DUMNY2 = DUNNY3 = DUNMY4 = 0.
Chi—square value = 6.2947, Probability > 6.2947: 0.1782.References
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